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F
lip to the section on exchange
rates in almost any economics
textbook and you will find one of
the profession’s most widely accepted
notions on the workings of global trade.
Gregory Mankiw’s Macroeconomics puts
it as plainly as any: “If the real exchange
rate is high, foreign goods are relatively
cheap, and domestic goods are relative-
ly expensive. If the real exchange rate 
is low, foreign goods are relatively
expensive, and domestic goods are 
relatively cheap.”
It sounds so simple. An appreciating
dollar, you would expect, would lead
Americans to consume more foreign
products relative to domestic products.
But, in fact, this often turns out not to
be the case, at least in the short run.
Consider the real exchange rate of
the dollar since 2001 — it has depreci-
ated fairly sharply. But during the same
period imports grew — even though
the dollar’s performance should have
sent them in the other direction. (The
difference between “real” and “nomi-
nal” exchange rates is important. Real
rates take into account the diverging
inflation rates of the two nations whose
money is being exchanged. So when,
say, an American travels to England, he
needs to consider not only how many
pounds he can buy with a dollar — the
nominal exchange rate — but also
which goods he can buy in England with
those pounds.) 
Exchange rates have long been one
of the most difficult macroeconomic
variables to model. As an important
“price” in an economy — particularly
“open” economies dependent on trade
— an exchange rate would seem likely
to have a wide impact on any number of
economic transactions, and thus have a
strong connection with the underlying
economy. In many economic models,
monetary stimulus is supposed to raise
domestic GDPwhile lowering the value
of the home currency — an implied 
correlation between depreciations and
business-cycle expansions.
The problem is that real-life data
don’t clearly show this relationship.
This problem even has a name: the
exchange rate disconnect puzzle.
Early Work
Credit for the discovery of the puzzle
goes to economists Kenneth Rogoff
and Richard Meese. In 1983, they
demonstrated the complete lack of 
correlation between real exchange rates
and other economic variables in devel-
oped countries. At the time, they were
staff economists at the Federal Reserve
Board of Governors charged with 
figuring out not only why exchange
rates moved but also finding a way to
forecast their movements. As Rogoff,
now at Harvard, recounted in a 2002
essay, they produced a model aimed 
at answering this simple question: 
“We will tell you what money supplies,
interest rates, and outputs are going to
be one year hence. You have to predict
the exchange rate.”
They failed. But in failing, they sort
of succeeded. What Rogoff and Meese
had done was to make vividly clear that
existing exchange rate models were
largely useless. They discovered that a
simple random-walk model — where
future rate movements have no relation
to past movements — was as good or
even a better predictor of exchange
rates than the day’s standard forecast-
ing models. Rogoff and Meese
concluded that there was no stable set
of variables to explain exchange rates in
any coherent way over 12- to 18-month
horizons. And their conclusion has
stood up over two decades and literally
hundreds of studies. “Basically, the
problem is not simply that it is virtually
impossible to predict exchange rates,”
Rogoff wrote in an e-mail exchange for
this story. “No variable, or set of vari-
ables, seems to explain them after the
fact.”
In the late 1980s, economists Alan
Stockman and Marianne Baxter
showed how the disconnect runs both
ways. Just as Rogoff and Meese couldn’t
use macro-variables to explain
exchange rate swings, Stockman and
Baxter demonstrated that exchange
rate volatility seems to have no major,
systematic impact on macro-variables.
Together with the Rogoff-Meese inno-
vation, these remain the most
important advances in understanding
the exchange rate disconnect puzzle.
The puzzle can pose problems for
policymakers. Without a clear under-
standing of how exchange rates relate to
the economy, how are they to respond
to currency volatility? In less-developed
countries with immature capital mar-
kets, exchange rate volatility can cause
significant harm to the economy. It can
trigger the shifting of resources in a
very dramatic way across sectors of the
country in question.
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But the case is different for well-
developed countries: Should policy-
makers there worry about the wobbling
values of their currencies? Or, looking
at the disconnect data, should they 
simply conclude that getting overly
exercised about exchange rates is a
waste of time, given their lack of impact
on the underlying economy? In particu-
lar, policymakers who worry about
exchange rate movements have to
weigh the relative merits of the two
leading ways to manage their currencies
— through fixed or floating systems.
Fixed Or Flexible?
The world’s leading industrial nations
began a movement to floating exchange
rate regimes in the 1970s. It was at that
time that the U.S. economic woes led to
the devaluation of the dollar. Since so
many other countries’ currencies were
pegged to the dollar under the Bretton
Woods agreement of 1944, the dollar
devaluation led to waning confidence in
the system, and countries began to exit
it wholesale.
Today, there is no clear consensus
among economists on which is the best
exchange rate regime. Flexible
exchange rate systems are those in
which governments do not intervene in
foreign exchange markets to try to
influence their currencies. This kind of
system carries the virtue of letting the
market determine currency values,
which makes it more likely that a coun-
try’s exchange rate bears close relation
to underlying economic conditions.
Additionally, a flexible regime 
allows monetary policy to be used on
economic objectives other than influ-
encing exchange rates — most
importantly, price stability. 
By contrast, countries that peg their
exchange rate must concentrate “mone-
tary policy” on manipulating the
exchange rate. However, some econo-
mists believe that fixed rate systems —
in which a government buys and sells its
currency at the necessary amounts to
keep its exchange rate pegged to some
other currency — are more convenient,
reduce information costs, and foster
international trade by reducing volatility.
Fixed systems are also more immediately
useful in controlling inflation. In fact,
theoretically, fixed-exchange rate
nations should have the same long-run
inflation rates as the country they are
pegging to, thanks to something called
the “purchasing power parity theory.”
This theory, according to Stockman’s
Introduction to Economics, says that
exchange rates change to equalize the
prices of products in all countries over
the long run.
The trade-offs inherent in each 
system are evident in the currency crisis
that struck Argentina in 2002.
Argentina had adopted a currency
board regime — in which its peso was
pegged to the dollar — in 1991 as a
means, in part, to fight hyperinflation.
It worked in that regard, immediately
tamping down consumer prices. But in
the mid-1990s, some of its South
American neighbors and then several
Asian countries saw their currencies
decline rapidly. That made the peso,
linked to the dollar, overvalued and in
turn made Argentine exports more
expensive. So in early 2002, Argentina
abandoned the currency peg and let 
the peso devalue so that Argentine
products would be cheaper. This led to
another round of inflation and also had
the negative side effect of hurting the
investments of multinational firms that
did business in Argentina.
The Argentine experience is
emblematic of the kinds of choices 
policymakers face in trying to handle
exchange rate movements. If their 
currencies are managed, should they
intervene heavily in foreign exchange
markets to keep them stable? If they are
allowed to float, should the central
bank — like the Fed in the United
States — sometimes try to influence
them through the use of monetary 
policy? The answers are elusive in large
part because of the exchange rate 
disconnect puzzle and the inability 
of economists to produce models 
which would suggest clear paths for 
policymakers.
Over the years, scores of econo-
mists have tried to tackle the exchange
rate disconnect puzzle. Some of the
biggest progress came from the puz-
zle’s pioneer, Rogoff himself. Just a few
years ago, he teamed with economist
Maurice Obstfeld in trying to explain
why macroeconomic fundamentals are
so out of whack with exchange rate
movements. Their answer, in a 2000
paper, was basically that the
economies of big, industrialized
nations tend to be complicated. 
This means that markets are not fully
integrated, so that price changes in
one segment don’t affect those in 
others. Together with sticky prices,
this market segmentation can largely
insulate consumers from exchange-
rate swings. “Only gradually will the
responses of importers and exporters
feed through to the retail level,”
Obstfeld and Rogoff wrote.
The Exchange Rate and Foreign Trade
Despite the dollar’s decline, the trade deficit has continued to rise.
NOTE: The red line represents the weighted average of the real foreign exchange values of the U.S. dollar
against the currencies of a large group of major U.S. trading partners, and is plotted against the left Y-axis.
The black line represents monthly data on the trade deficit, and is plotted against the right Y-axis.
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Richmond Research
Margarida Duarte, an economist with
the Richmond Fed and a former stu-
dent of Stockman’s at the University of
Rochester, has focused much of her
research on the exchange rate discon-
nect puzzle. In one recent paper,
Duarte examines what happens when
nations move from fixed to flexible
exchange rate regimes, hoping therein
to learn more about why exchange rates
can be so volatile compared with other
macroeconomic variables. In a second
paper, she develops a model in which
the complicated workings of financial
markets play a significant role in
explaining the exchange rate discon-
nect puzzle. In both cases, she builds on
a sticky price model developed by
Obstfeld and Rogoff in 1995.
In a paper published in the Journal
of Monetary Economics, she presented a
model that successfully replicated
real-world results. It showed that
“moving from pegged to floating rates
generates a substantial increase in the
volatility of the real exchange rate,”
but not in other variables. This was in
keeping with the vexing data that the
only distinction across exchange rate
regimes is dramatic change in
exchange rate volatility. The model,
Duarte says, usefully explores the 
merits of different exchange rate
regimes. It also advances the literature
on why exchange rates are more unsta-
ble than other variables. But it doesn’t
get to the other side of the “discon-
nect” puzzle — what are the sources of
uncertainty that generate substantial
exchange rate instability (and which is
not transmitted to other variables) but
no substantial instability in other
macro-variables?
In a 2005 paper with Stockman, who
is also a former visiting scholar at the
Richmond Fed, the two aimed to answer
that question more directly. Like past
models, theirs sought to tie the determi-
nation of exchange rates to consumer
decisions. The twist was to leave a role
for the “asset-price” nature of exchange
rates. By this, they intended to add a fea-
ture wherein exchange rates are a)
affected by shocks to the financial mar-
kets and b) these shocks only show up in
the financial markets, not in the under-
lying economy. The results looked much
more like what happens in the real
world. “Now I can generate a much 
higher volatility of nominal exchange
rates without that implying high volatil-
ity of consumption allocations or high
comovement across these two sets of
variables,” Duarte says.
Rogoff himself continues to study
the problem and says that Duarte’s and
Stockman’s joint efforts are “very prom-
ising for understanding some aspects of
the disconnect puzzle.” But all this still
leaves plenty of room for improvement.
Quantitatively, the Duarte-Stockman
model is not an answer to why exchange
rates are more volatile than other
macro-variables. Having identified
asset prices as one of the key variables
in exchange rate movements, econo-
mists still haven’t figured out a good
way to model asset prices in keeping
with their behavior in the real economy.
Alot of it comes down to the complex-
ities of drawing up coherent, consistent
models that accurately resemble real-
world data. It is difficult to write down
models that account for such things as
idiosyncratic risk, for example. And the
way foreign exchange markets are typi-
cally modeled may be too simplified.
A counter-explanation for the
exchange rate disconnect puzzle: That
some currency traders are inexperi-
enced and thus behaving irrationally.
It’s true, Duarte says, that the model
with “noise traders” of economists
Michael Devereux and Charles Engel
generates exchange rate swings that
seem to have no correlation to 
economic fundamentals. But proving
that there is a connection between
irrational speculation and the
exchange rate disconnect puzzle
remains another matter. “Either
model may ‘explain’ the data,” Duarte
and Stockman argue, “if only in the
sense of labeling our ignorance, or
might promote better understanding
of the issues. But these kinds of 
success have limits: They do not imply
that a model is appropriate for 
analyzing welfare, or policies.”
Duarte says, “There’s progress but
it’s slow. We need to model these
economies in a more realistic way so
that idiosyncratic risk matters more.
That’s where we are now.”
Rogoff agrees that progress is being
made. But he tends to think that his
work of more than 20 years ago contin-
ues to hold important lessons for
policymakers who “fret endlessly about
exchange rate volatility.”
He says: “The exchange rate discon-
nect puzzle suggests that, at least for
countries with well-developed capital
markets, perhaps they should take a
more relaxed attitude.” RF
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